The pr~sml study tested the k~pothesis tho t JUTWS compfj sekctiv~ly with instructions to disregard inadmissible midmce. A total of81 mock jurors read n murdrr hial summary in which a wiretap was ruM admissitl~, inad mts~i bk because il was nol rdia blc, or inadmhrsibb kcuzssc it was ilkgully o btaimd ( t h~r e was also a no-wiretap roniro L p u p ) . 
D u r i n g the course of ewry trial, b e jury is instructed to render a verdict based solely on facts formally adtnitted into evidence. The courts have thus developed elabw rate rules designed to regulate the trafnc of information i n the courtroom and ensure that these goals are achieved. These rules dictate who may serve as a witness, the kind of testimony that may be gwen, the content and format of direct and cross-examination questions, the scope of opening and closing smternenn, and the phrasing of the judge's instructions (see According to the rules of evidence, information is admissible i€ it is relevant and has probative value--unless it was illegally obtained or is inflammatory, mkleading, confusing, or redundant. If a lawyer or witness discloses inadmissible testimony in court and if the opposing attorney objects, the judge tpically slrikes the evidence f?om the record and admonishes rhc jury to disregard it. On the question of whether jurors comply with this instruction, Kassin and Studebaker (in press) described different theoretical perspec rives that suggest a range or possible effects. Studies of directed forgetting show that people can ignore infornlation o n command, depending on how the to-be-forgotten items are encoded, the scope of the instruction, the type of retrieval ask. and other factors (Johnson, 1994 Do irlstrucfiol~s tr: rlisregdrd have ; curative effect, serving as a "mental erasel-" that 1r;idsjurors to discount material to which they have been exposed? There is widespread disagreeme111 ~lthin thc courts.' Moreover, rcsearch has yielded mixed results. In a n early experiment, Sue, Smith, and Caldwtll (1973) had rr~ockjurors readabout a defendant charged with armed robbery and murder. In a control group contairling only weak circumstantial evidence, no orbe voted guilty. In a secondgroup, the prosec~~tion added a taped phone cor~versation in which the defendant made self-incriminating remarks. The defense argued that d~e wiretap was illegal, but the judge admitted the tape into evidence and the conviction rate increased to 26%. In a third group, the judge ruled the tape inadmissible and admonished the jury to disregard it, but 33% voted for conviction. Carret.ta and Moreland (1983) also found that mock jnrors presented with an inadmissible wiretap were more likely to judge the defendant guilty-not only in predeliberation ratings but in postdeliberation ratings as well.
Whereas the foregoing studies suggest that an instruction to disregard has n o effect, others suggest that it ma): even produce a "boomerang" effect. This phenomenon was first demonstrated in a mock jury study by Broeder (19591, who argued that admonishment draws added attention to the information in dispute, heightening its salience and accessibility in memory. Arguing t h a~ admonishment may also arouse psychological reacmnce, Wolf and Montgomery (1977) found that subjecu were least likely to complywith a prohibitory it~suuctiotl when the judge flatly stated, 'You have no choicc but to disregard it." More recently, Pickel (1995) found that mock jurors discounted inadmissible testimony whet1 given a simple instruction to disregard but not when the admonishment included an extensive legal explanation. As in the Wolf and Montgomery study, elaborated admonishment proved counterproductive.
In contrast to these findings, some researchers have found that people can and do discount testimony that is later discredited (Elliott, Farrington, & Manheimer, 1988 Fong, and Rosenhan (1981) presented inadmissible evidence that either corroborated or contradicted the defendant's alibi and found that although mock jurors were not more likely to vote guilty when the inadmissible item implicated the defendant, they were more IjlicI); LO vote not guilty when that item favored acquittal. With false conviction being the least ~olerable outcome, they were unwilling to ignore information that vindicated the accused. Pickel (I995) found that mock jurors conlplied with an instruction to disregard hearsay, which is often excluded out of concern for reliability. In a second study, however, they did not disregard inadmissible testimorlv about the defendant's prior record, an item that has probative value but is excluded for fear that it is prejudicial. Unfortunately, the two studies varied in many ways, so the difference cannot be attributed to the relative probative values of the to-be-disregarded evidence. ' The present study was designed with two goals in mind. First, we sought to test the hypothesis that jurors comply on a selective basis with admonishmenrs to disregard. We predicted that jurors would discount evidence if it is r d e d inadmissible because it lacks credibility hut not if it is excluded because itviolates due process. Our second goal was to collect midtrial measures of the on-line impact of the instruction and test the hypothesis that an incriminating disclosure-even when it is immediately nithdrawxl-alters the way jurors evaluate the subsequent evidence. Each participant was thus provided with a hand-held response dial and asked to tnrn it up or down at specified points in the case to indicate the exrent to which Ihe evidence led them to see the defendant as guilt): or i r~r~u c e r~t .
Purticipanis and Design
A tntal of 81 ~~ndergraduates played the role of mock jurors it1 exchange for cxtra course crcdit. ScheduIed in small groups ranging in size from 2 to 6, students were iancir..miy assigned to one cjf You( ~atlCiiti01ls that i1a1 izd in the preserttati~rj and jcdgr'r ruling on a critical itcm of irlcr~minating evidence (a5 = 19 to 2 1). which h e defendant can be heard confessing to a friend minutes after fleeing the scene ("I killer1 Marylou and some bastard she was with. God, 1 don't . . . yeah, I ditched the blade"). 3 In all conditions, the defense lawyer objected to this disclosure. 111 the admissible group, the judge overruled the objection, admitted the tape, and instructed the jury that it was proper as a form of evidence. In the inadmissible/due-process group, the judge sustained the objectior~ and admonished the jury to disregard the tape because it was secured without a proper warrant. He explained that to ensure a fair trial, the jury should not consider evidence that was illegally obtained. In the inadmissible/unreliahle group, the judge again sustained the objection but admonished the jury to disregard the tape because it was barely audible and difficult to determine what was said. The judge the11 explained that to ensure a fair trial, a jury should not consider evidence that is unrelial~le. In all groups, t h e w j r e~p appeared in Paragraph 9 and the judge's ruling in Paragraph 10.
U t e Slimulus
Up011 their arrival, participants were told that to simplify and condense the trial presetltatiorl, we had prepared a written summary of an actual case. They were informed that the entire case would bc summarized irl paragraphs and shown on a 'lV monitor and that each paragraph would be prcscntcd for 35 s (this pacc was determined through a pl etesri~lg ilf .exling times) Tu examine ~h r , ~rl-line impact of the wiretap iturn and the judgr.5 ruiii~g arid their possible etfccu on perceptions of subsetlurnl evidence, we gave each parcicipar~t a wireless hand-held respcmsr dial equipped wth a d~gital numeric display that ranged from 0 (with the dial pointed to the left) to 100 (with the dial pointed to the far tight), with a midpoint of 50 (with the hand pointed siraight up) .4Thr cxperirnenter h e n read the following instructio~~s:
To get your ~i e w s on the material while it is fresh in your mind, I will ask you to register your responses using these hand-held dials. Each of you will be given a dial 10 hold. After each paragraph, the word "respond" will appear on rhe screen. You will then have 10 seconds to register your response to that item on a scale ranging from 0 to 100. You c a n make your response as precise as you want by checking the digital readout on the face of the dial.
As I said, your responses can range from 0 to 100. As we start the experiment, I'd like you to set your dial to 50-which we define as the neutral point. You will have 10 seconds to settle in on a rrspunse. Alter you do, leave the dial alone, and your response will be recorded. When 1 say the word "reset," you should then reset your dial to 50. At that point, you'll receive another item of evidence for 35 seconds, read it, respond, reset the dial for thc next itetn, and so on, until the entire rrial summary has been presented.
Any questions?
Participants watched the videotape and rated each item for the extent to which i t portrayed the defcrldant as innocet~t or guilty on a 0-100 wale. The presentation took 18 min. Afterward, all participants filled out a questionnaire in which they rendered a verdic t (guilty or not guilty) and rated d~e i r confidence in thatjudgment on a 10-point scale (ranging from I = not a! all to 10 = 7~q conjdent) . With verdicts being a dual function of thc subjective probability that the defendant committed the crime and the standard of proof deemed necessary for conviction, thcse factors were also assessed. All participants hus estimated the likelihood that the defendant committed the murder by circling a number frotn 0 to 100 and filled in the sentence, 'The defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a -% chance that he committed the crime." They then listed the factors thar Ied to their verdicts. As a check on the effectiveness of our manipulations, those in the experimental groups were also asked to recall the defense Lawyer's reaction to the wiretap, the judge's ruling, and the reason for that ruling.
RESULTS

Manipulntion Checks
Participants in the experimental conditions were uniformly accurate in their understanding of our manipulations. All mock jurors recalled that the defense attorney had objected to the wiretap, 58 o~i t of 60 correctly recalled the judge's ruling, and 39 out of 41 in thr two inadmissible groups correctly recalled the judge's explanation for his instruction (that the wiretap evidcnce was either illegally obtained or not reliable). Thcrc were no significant betweengroup differenccs on any of thcsc measures.
Posttrial Measures
Overall, 56 participants voted guilty, and 45 voted not guilty, yielding a conviction rate of 44.4%. Broken down by condition, the resuits support the hypothesis that jurors would exhibit selective compliance with instructions to disregard. Compared with a low 24% conviction rate in the coritrul group, thc conviction rate increased in the admissible wiretap group (79%) and in the inadmissiMeidue-process group ( 3 5 % ) but not in the inadrnissible/unreliable group (24%), ~' ( 3 , N = 81) = 17.31, p < .OO 1 (see Figure I ) .
To obtain a more sensitive measure of verdict preferences, a scalar variable was created by assigning positive confidence values to guilty verdicts and negative values to not-guilq verdicts. Scores could thus range from -10 (maximum confide~lce in a not-guilty verdict) to +10 (maximum confidence in a guilty verdict). A one-way ANOVA on this measure produced a significant difference, F(3, 77) = 11.23, p < .001. Post hoc tests revealed that compared with the control group ( M = -2.90), participants were significantly more likely to vim the defendant as guilt): when the wiretap was admissible or when i t was inadmissible because it violated due process (Ah = 6.16 arid 2.15, respectively; p < -05 via NewmanEieuls). In contrast, they were not more likely to judge the defendant guilty when the wiretap was inadmissible due to a lack of reliability ( M = -2.14).
After rendering a verdict, a11 participants estimated the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime on a 0-to 100point scale. Closely paralleling the verdictconfidence data, a one-way AXOVA revealed a sig11if1-cant overall difference, F(3, 77)= 5.41, P < .002. Compared with a mean probability estimate of 58.57 in the control group, there were significant increases in the admissible and inadmissiblc/due-process corlditiorls (Ms = 82.89 and 76.75, respectively; ps < .05 via NeuqnatlKeuls) b u~ llor in the inadmissible/unreliable condition (M = 65.48). On the standard-f-proof item, participants estimated thal there should be at least an 89.22% chance that the dcfundant committed the crime before voting guilty. This quantification of "beyond a reasonable doubt" cIoscly ma~ches estimates ot~rained in prior rcsearch (Kagrhiro, 1990) There were n o be wee:^-group differences or1 this measrirc, F(3, 77) < 1.
TCI assess the self-reported influence of the wiretap evidence, all participants were asked to list the facturs that led them to reach their verdict. These open-ended responses were later coded for whether the wiretap was on the list. Among participants in the experimental groups, there was an interesting, highly significat~t difference. Whereas 63% cited the wiretap in the admissible group, only 15% and 14% listed this item in the inadmissible/due-process and inadmissible/unreliable groups, respectively, ;~'(2, N = 60) = 14.56, $ < .001. Thus, although participants in the inadmissible/due-process condition were clearly affected by the forbidden wiretap evidence, they did not cite that item as important in their self-reports.
On-Line Euidmce Ratings
Participants rated each paragraph for the exlerit to which it led h e m to see the defendant as innocent or guilty. Using the computerized hand-held dials described earlier, these ratings were made on a scale ranging from 0 (innocent) to 100 (guilty), with 50 defined as the neutral point. These data were then analyzed within a 4 (condition) x 2 3 (items of evidence) repeated-measures ANOVA.
Consistent with the posttrial results, a significant main effect for condition, F(3,72) = 8.1 1, p < .001, revealed that participants saw the evidence overall as more incriminating in the admissible (M= 68.14) and inadmissible/ due-proctss groups (M = 60.09) than 111 the control I M = 52.97) and inadmissible/uni-eliable groups (,\I = 55.75).
.4 significant main effrcl also indicated, as expected, that some itemswere seen as morc incrimi~lating than uthers, F(22,1,584) = 32.37, P < .001. More Important, a significant tweway interaction was also obtained, F(ti6, 1,584) = 3.97, P < ,001. As show1 in F i p~r e 2, mock jurors From the four groups reacted si~nilarly to the evidence untiI the wiretap was introduced (I tern 9) and ruled o n by the judge (Item l o ) , at which point perccptions of rhe evidence diverged sharply. To focur on t h e specific effects of the wiretap and the judge's ruling, wu compared the four groups for their perceptions of these nvo itcms, ks shown in Figure 3 (Item 9 ) , guilt ratings irlcreased sharply in response to the wiretap disclosure it1 all expcrirncr~tal conditions (admissible :V1 = 81. F(3,74) = 1.01, P < .50. On the combincd postdisclosure ratings, however, there was a highly significant effect, F(3,74) = 9.10, P< ,001. As shown in Figure 3 , the postdisclosure ratingswere lowest in the control { M = 52.38) and inadmissible/unreliable gtoitps (:\.I = 56.25) and were higher in h t h the admissible and h e u~admissible/ due-process groups (IMS = 72.47 artd 62.37, respectively; all p < .05 via Newman-Keiils) . k d n g s were also significantly higher when the tape w a s admissible d~a n in the inadmissihlc/due-proccss group (p < .05).
DISCUSSION
The ptesetlt study provided strong srlpporr for the hypolhesis chat jurors would exhibit selective compliance 14th itlsuucuons to disregard inadmissible eviderlce. Participants read a murder case in which a wire-' tap was ruled admissible, inadmissible because it was not reliable, or inadmissible because it violated the defendant's rights. As predicted, the jurors were more likely to judge the defendant guilty in the admissible and inarlrnissible/due-process groups than in the admissible/ unreliable and control groups.
Participants also rated the evidence during the trial using hand-held response dials. These data revealed that the wiretap disclosure was seen as highly incriminating in all experimental groups but that the judge's ruling lowered guilt ratings only in the inadmissible/unreliable group. Also interesting is that the wiretap item-even when immediately followed by an instruction to disregard-altered the way subsequently presented evidence was evaluated. Jurors in the admissible and inadmissible/ due-process groups thus saw the remaining items as generally more incriminating than did those in the inadmissible/unreliable and corltrol groups. This latter result is consistent with Pcr~ningtor~ and Hastie's (1992) notion thatjurors engage in integrative processing of the evidence and with social-cognitive research on the assimilation of new information to preexisting beliefs (DarIey & Gross, 1983) .
To test the integrative processing hypothesis via the on-line evidence ratings, it was necessary to ensure that participants rated the irlcrinlination value of each indi- vidual item, not provide cumulative ratings of the defendant based on all previous items. Participants were thus asked to set their response dials to 50 (the neutral midpoint) rather than to 0 (as implied by a presumption of innocence), and o u r instructions stated clearly and repeatedly that each rating should be "based on the last item of evidence," "as a result of the last item of evidence," "depending o n p u r view of the evidence summarized in the preceding paragraph," and "in the paragraph you just read." Moreover, participants were required to physically reset the dials to 50 after each rating. The tluctuating response patterns show11 in Figure 2 suggest that they followed our directions to rate each item on i t 5 own terms. These patterns contrast sharply with those found in pretesting for participants who were asked to start at 0 and ratc their curnL1-lative impressions of the defendant withr)ut rebetting the dials."
Both midtrial and posttrial judgments support the hypothesis that jurors comply with an instruction to disregard when cvidence is inadmissible due to a lack r~f credibility but not when i t is excluded due to a legal technicality. Participants in the former situation thus behaved as jurors should-in contrast to findings o b taincd in belief perseverance studies in which people maiil~ain their ncwly formed beliefs even after the s u p porling evidence has beet1 discredited (Anderson et al., 1980 : Johnson % Seifert, 1994 Schul &Burnstein, 1985) . It is interesting that participants in the latter situation also appeared lo behave as ideal jurors in that they did discount the testimony irnmcdiately after the judge's ruling and did not later cite i t as having swayed their verdicts. I t is impartant to note, howcvcr, that these same participant3 saw subsequent itcms of elidence as generally Inore incriminating and were more likely to vote guilty. These results suggest that jurors may be influcnced without realizing it-and not by a judge's ruling per se hut by their attribution for that ruli~lg. As we reasoned earlier, it is precisely because jurors seek jugt outcomes that h e y cannot resist the temptation to ure it~fattnation they see as relevant-whether it sarisfics thc law's technical rules or not.
